Friday, July 15, 2011

devalvirati ili ne devalvirati? ovo je tekst za buduća predavanja

Šta zači ovo HK i gde bi tu bila Srbja, a gde EU?


3 comments:

Nemanja said...

Nouriel Roubini prvo kaze:

"First, note that the argument that currency board will lead to fiscal discipline is based on the following logic. Suppose that a fiscal deficit is due to political distortions of various sorts that lead fiscal policy makers to spend too much and tax too little. Then, if fiscal authorities know that the automatic monetization of fiscal deficits is not possible under a currency board, the incentive to have large budget deficits should be reduced. I.e., if the fiscal authorities realize that a fiscal deficit will not be monetized by the central bank, their political incentives to spend a lot and have large deficits will be reduced."

pa onda:

"This was, for example, the logic behind experiments such a the "divorce" between Treasury and Central Bank adopted by Italy in the early 1980s. The "divorce" implied that the Central Bank was not forced any more to passively finance fiscal deficit by printing money. This should have lead to more discipline imposed on the fiscal authorities. The consequence of this divorce on the fiscal deficit were, however, quite different from those expected from theory. Such a divorce did not reduce the political bias of the fiscal authorities (at least until the late 1980s) as the deficits were caused by structural political distortions. Instead, as seigniorage revenues sharply dropped after the divorce, fiscal deficits remained high and were instead more bond-financed rather than seigniorage-financed. As a consequence, the Italian public debt that had remained constant (as a share of GDP) in the 1970s thanks to seigniorage revenues, exploded in the 1980s: the fiscal deficits were financed by debt rather than money and the public debt to GDP ratio increased from about 50% to over 120% in the early 1990s. Again, the lesson is that fixed rules such a fiscal-monetary divorce or a currency board do not, by themselves, impose a fiscal discipline. If the political biases or structural causes of deficits remain, less monetization of deficits will lead to greater reliance on debt-financing of such deficits. A currency board, by itself, cannot solve such political biases."

Ali pre toga kaze ovo:

"So why do these countries increase the money supply? The problem, typically, is that a political impasse makes it nearly impossible to reduce the deficit. Given the government's budget constraint, it must then issue debt. Now for US debt there is apparently no shortage of ready buyers, but the same can't be said for Argentina or Russia. If they can't issue debt and they can't reduce the deficit, the only alternative left is to print money: in short, when they can't pay their bills any other way, they pay them with money, which is easy enough to print."

Srbija usvaja devizno vece => rast novcane ponude ogranicen & nema stampanja novca

Rast novcane ponude ogranicen & Srbija ne moze da se zaduzuje poput Amerike => Fiskalni deficit jedino moguce redukovati smanjenjem drzavne potrosnje i dodatnim oporezivanjem & Fiskalna disciplina se podstice.

Srbija usvaja devizno vece => Fiskalna disciplina se podstice

Danica Popović said...

Meni je ključan ovde stav da nije stvar u fiksnom kursu nego u dobrim fiskalnim politikama, ako hocete uspesan ambijent. Dakle, nezavisno od kursa - ako vodite dobru fiskalnu politiku uopšte vam ne treba currency board - a on vam može debelo našoditi ako naiđe neki ojači egzogeni šok koji bi se u slučaju fleksibilnog kursa mogao lako amortizovati devalvacijom.

Ali Rubini ima ovaj jaki argument, takođe
As the currency is pegged, an expansionary fiscal policy does not immediately lead to a humiliating currency depreciation. Instead, the deviant fiscal behavior can for a while be hidden behind a bond-financing of the deficits with no devaluation or with a loss of foreign reserves if the deficit is financed through a monetary increase in domestic credit. Either way, the market disciplined against fiscal deficits is loosened. As long as politicians have a short-term horizon - maybe because the know they may not be in power in the medium term - they may prefer to avoid paying the political costs of a depreciation following deviant fiscal behavior by adopting a fixed exchange rate regime that - in the short-run - prevent the currency from falling following bad economic policies. Then, fiscal discipline and, more in general, good economic policy discipline may be lessened under a regime of fixed exchange rates compared to a regime of flexible exchange rates.

ovo je slučaj bosne i kosova gde medjunarodna zajednica krpi rupe u budžetima, inače ove zemlje ne bi ni postojale

Danica Popović said...

Ali ima 3 eliminatorna razloga
1) realna apresijacija usled Balassa-Samuelsonovog efekta će konstatno praviti inflaciju u zemlji, koju ne možeš sprečiti
2) nema odbrane od egzogenih šokova
3) mogućnost špekulativnog udara i gubitak rezervi

a dobitak od cb i dolarizadije je svakako u nemogućnosti valutne krize... što je neviđeno moćna prednost